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Against Circumspection: Judges, Religious
Symbols, and Signs of Moral Independence
Benjamin L Berger*

INTRODUCTION
Issues of symbolic interpretation have emerged as a mainstay of
the transnational jurisprudence on law and religion. How should we
understand the social and legal significance of a crucifix hanging on the
wall in an Italian classroom?1 What is the meaning and political valence
of a headscarf, and how does this differ in Turkey2 and France?3 How
should we interpret the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance,4
and what is the nature, meaning, and effect—what is the
phenomenology—of prayer?5 It is this latter question about the nature
and the communicative effects of prayer that was at the heart of the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Mouvement Laïque v Saguenay.6
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Thank you to the contributors
to this volume, and to my co-editor Richard Moon, for their valuable comments on an
early version of this chapter. I am also very grateful to Rachel Devon for her superb
research assistance.
1

Lautsi and Others v Italy ECHR 2011-III 2412, 54 EHRR 3.

2

Leyla Sahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 819, 44 EHRR 5.

See Mayanthi Fernando, ‘Reconfiguring Freedom: Muslim Piety and the Limits of
Secular Law and Public Discourse in France’ (2010) 37 American Ethnologist 19.
3

4

Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow 542 US 1 (2004).

Town of Greece v Galloway 572 US (2014). On the question of the phenomenology of
prayer and its intelligibility to law, see Benjamin L Berger, ‘The Legal Unintelligibility of
Prayer’, https://perma.cc/Q32Y-E5UK.
5
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Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City) 2015 SCC 16.
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The Court proceeded with notable confidence in finding that an
individual who did not share the religious beliefs reflected in the prayer
at issue in Saguenay would experience it as exclusionary, and as an
affront to state neutrality. Given the context and the specific prayer at
issue, perhaps that is so, and perhaps that effect properly dictated the
outcome in that case. But apart from the ‘empirical’ question of how this
prayer would be perceived, there are distinct and important questions
about how it could and should be interpreted. Such questions are, I
suggest, always salient in cases involving religious symbols. Otherwise
put, how much are we willing to ask of one another—of politicians, of
fellow citizens, of judges—by way of interpretive creativity, flexibility,
and nimbleness when met with the appearance of religion in public life?
And who ought to bear that interpretive onus? Given a symbolically
complicated social world, made so in part owing to religious and cultural
difference that we seek to support and constitutionally protect, such
questions seem to be increasingly exigent.
This chapter takes up these questions surrounding the
interpretation of religious signs and symbols—and the interpretive
possibilities that emerge when we demand more from one another in
thinking about such symbols—by examining the question of judges and
religious dress in the particular context of the judge’s role as wielding the
coercive force of the state through the exercise of criminal punishment. I
advance the argument that recent debates have proceeded on a
misleadingly simplistic approach to understanding the meaning of signs
of religious belonging and identity in this setting and that, with this, we
miss an opportunity for a deeper understanding of the virtues that we
hope to find in our public officials.
In recent years, and consistent with Canadian constitutional
history, Quebec has been the gravitational centre of debates and
reflection in Canada about the management of religious difference in a
religiously diverse society. Political and legal debates within Quebec
have tended to raise, with particular clarity, issues that are salient across
the country. Two recent happenings in the law and politics of religion in
Quebec stand out.7
There are others, including issues of religious education, an issue that has found its
way to the Supreme Court of Canada in the form of the cases of SL v Commission scolaire
des Chênes 2012 SCC 7 and Loyola High School v Québec (Attorney General) 2015 SCC 12.
The case of Saguenay (n 6), which concerned prayer at the outset of municipal council
7
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In 2008 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor released their coauthored report arising from the Consultation Commission on
Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Difference, the ‘BouchardTaylor Report’.8 The report advocated a model of open secularism, one
that would navigate the imperatives of regard for religious difference
and the particularities of Quebec history and culture, through a more or
less embracing regard for the accommodation of religious practices. The
report arose from a sense of public concern about the issue of religious
difference, concern generated to some extent in response to court
decisions that had required the accommodation of minority religious
practices. In their report, Bouchard and Taylor urged the government to
prepare a white paper on how to approach the question of religious
accommodation in Quebec.
In 2013 the Parti Québecois (PQ) government took up this
invitation and placed the ‘Charter of Quebec Values’, or so-called
‘Charter of Secularism’, on the public table for debate.9 Although it
proposed a number of amendments and initiatives, Bill 60’s most
controversial aspect was the prohibition that it would place on public
employees wearing ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols. The Bill advanced a
very different vision of the state relationship to religion than that urged
in the Bouchard-Taylor report. Most academic and public commentators
(including Charles Taylor himself) condemned the Bill’s exclusionary
and closed vision of secularism, and contested not only the political
position evident in the Bill, but the internal consistency and rationality of
the measures that it introduced. The Parti Québecois gambled and lost
when they sought to place the fate of this Bill at the heart of a snap
provincial election, an election that returned a devastating electoral

meetings, in its own way raised questions of state neutrality and the appearance of
religion in public life, the focus of this chapter and others in this volume.
Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation
(Quebec, Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accomodement reliées aux
différences culturelles, 2008).
8

Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality
between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests, 1st sess,
40th Leg, Quebec, 2013.
9
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defeat for the PQ, albeit a defeat that does not neatly or stably track
support for the Bill.10
There seems to be a great deal of conceptual distance between the
Bouchard-Taylor Report and Bill 60. They assume markedly different
postures toward the accommodation of religion and the management of
religious diversity in Quebec. And yet there are two notable points of
convergence. First, both documents assume that the place to begin when
addressing the issue of the just management of religious difference in
contemporary society is with a set of claims about the nature and
demands of ‘the secular’. In retrospect, one might well read Bouchard
and Taylor’s emphasis on defining an idea of the secular as a fateful
move in the road towards Bill 60, one that permitted a denatured,
simplistic, and abstract claim about what secularism implies to drive a
vision of religion’s place in Quebec society. Bouchard and Taylor rooted
their views and recommendations in an understanding of secularism, as
did the Parti Québecois when the government advanced a conception of
laïcité appropriate to Quebec, one that drew heavily from a particular –
and arguably misleading – understanding of the nature of French
laïcité.11 Whether one creates more heat than light through seeking to
deduce just approaches to dealing with religious difference from ideal
concepts such as secularism is an important question; this episode in
Quebec feeds my scepticism about this kind of approach.12 Appeals to
the nature and demands of such broad concepts can draw attention away
from the complicated social, historical, and political facts associated with
religious difference in a given society, clearing the way for policy
prescriptions that—like Bill 60—have regressive and exclusionary effects.
Yet this chapter is focused on an issue that arises at a second point
of convergence between these two moments in the recent history of law
and religion in Quebec. Despite the normative space between the
Many other factors were at play in the election, including stances taken about Quebec
sovereignty and the perennially crucial electoral issue—the economy.
10

Bowen shows that the conventional image of French laïcité is radically misleading in
its effacing of the rich associational lives that are lived beneath the rhetoric about a
single republican identity. See John R Bowen, Can Islam Be French?: Pluralism and
Pragmatism in a Secularist State (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009).
11

For a fuller account of my scepticism on this point, see Benjamin L Berger, ‘Belonging
to Law: Religious Difference, Secularism, and the Conditions of Civic Inclusion’ (2015)
24 Social & Legal Studies 47.
12

4

Published in Benjamin L Berger and Richard Moon, eds., Religion and the Exercise of
Public Authority (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2016) 23.

Bouchard-Taylor report and Bill 60, and although the Bouchard-Taylor
report rejected a general prohibition on the wearing of religious symbols
that would apply to all agents of the state, both agreed that judges—
along with Crown prosecutors, police officers, prison guards, and the
president and vice-president of the national assembly—should be barred
from wearing religious ‘signs’. In the case of Bill 60, this bar on judges
wearing religious symbols was caught up in the general ban that was the
focus of so much criticism. For Bouchard and Taylor, by contrast, these
figures were distinctively subject to such a prohibition, and this targeted
prohibition was justified by the particular character of the public duties
and authority that they exercised. Bouchard and Taylor explained that in
the case of other public officials, freedom of religion for these
individuals, as well as the imperative of equal access to public
employment, overcame any possible concern that the appearance of
religious affiliation might signal an absence of state neutrality or some
form of conflict of interest. For most public officials, Bouchard and
Taylor reasoned, we should look to the substance of how their public
duties are discharged: ‘we must evaluate agents of the State in light of
their acts. Do they display impartiality in the performance of their
duties? Do their religious beliefs interfere in point of fact with the
exercising of their professional judgment?’13
And yet, for Bouchard and Taylor, the balance came out
differently in the case of judges, police officers, and prison guards.
Although they clearly agonised over the decision, Bouchard and Taylor
ultimately concluded that these individuals should be prohibited from
wearing religious signs. The specific justification is of most interest to
this chapter:
We suggest that the appearance of impartiality imposes itself at the
highest level in the cases of judges, police officers and prison
guards, all of whom possess a power of punishment and even coercion in
respect of individuals such as defendants, accused person and
inmates, who are in a position of dependence and vulnerability.
[Emphasis added.]14

13

Bouchard and Taylor (n 8) 150.

14

ibid 151.
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Bouchard and Taylor argue that these figures should ‘impose on
themselves a form of circumspection concerning the expression of their
religious convictions’,15 a duty that translates into an obligation to not
wear items that mark their religious identity. ‘These are positions’, the
co-commissioners explained, ‘that strikingly exemplify State neutrality
and whose incumbents exercise a power of coercion.’16
It is this claim—that there is something about the public function
of state punishment and coercion that justifies the prohibition on judges
wearing religious symbols—that I want to explore and interrogate in this
chapter. In my view, the ban proposed by both Bill 60 and the BouchardTaylor report fails on some rather straightforward critiques, most clearly
the exclusion of particular religiously identified people (those for whom
religious belonging involves outwardly identifiable displays) from key
roles in the institutions of government. Prohibiting a person who will
perform his duties impartially and professionally from being a judge
because he wears a turban or kippah is not defensible.17 Bouchard and
Taylor were right to insist on focusing on the substance of one’s conduct
and treatment of others, rather than leaning on a semiotic analysis of
signs and symbols in pursuit of an abstract ideal of neutrality as nonparticularity, and this idea should carry through to police officers,
correctional officers, and judges.
But my particular interest is in the argument from punishment
and coercion. What should we make of this link between expressions of
religious belonging and the judge’s task of punishing? More than
arguing that Bouchard and Taylor’s reasoning on this point is simply
unconvincing, I will suggest that it might actually be backwards—that
the argument from the coercive and punishing roles of the judge might
provocatively point in just the other way. Might it be that reflection on
the character of these judicial tasks, and the virtues that we seek in the
exercise of those functions, should actually lead us to welcome a
judiciary that reflects and displays its religiously diverse nature?
The goal of this chapter is to trouble and disrupt the instinct that
religion and judicial authority are best hermetically sealed from one
15

ibid.

16

ibid.

See, eg, Jocelyn Maclure’s chapter in this volume for a powerful critique of such bans
on grounds of respect for identity and political morality.
17
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another, offering an alternative way that we might choose to read
religious symbols worn by judges. In this way, this argument should be
understood, more broadly, as engaged with the set of questions raised at
the outset of this chapter, questions about the burdens of interpretation
in a religiously diverse and multicultural society. In exploring the
specific issue of how we could and should read the appearance of
religious symbols on the person of a judge, this chapter thus also gestures
to this larger theme of the burdens of interpretation in a religiously plural
society. Beginning with some scene-setting in the form of a brief
discussion about the character of sentencing and punishment in Canada
and why it is a particularly helpful entry point into a discussion about
the judicial role, this chapter will take a historical excursion into the
imbrications of punishment, religion, and judgment in the common law
criminal trial.
Having thus recovered some material that could
contribute to a different reading or coding of the ‘conspicuous’ religious
affiliation of judges, I will suggest that there is actually something
structurally and politically appealing about markers that remind us that,
in their judgments about the exercise of state power, those who stand
between the will of a government and the infliction of coercive force on
individuals have moral independence from the bare wishes of
government.
WHY LOOK TO PUNISHMENT?
There is an obvious hazard involved in using sentencing and
punishment as the terrain on which to explore an argument for accepting
judicial displays of religious affiliation. To raise the issue will lead some
to imagine judges reasoning from religious authority or justifying
sentencing decisions on the basis of religious text or precept. James
Whitman has touched on the way in which the peculiar version of (non)separationism found in the United States—one in which religious
institutions and public institutions are meant to be insulated from one
another, but talk of religion circulates freely in political and legal
discourse—has resulted in distressing examples of biblically grounded
claims for greater punishment being made in US courtrooms.18 Of course
James Q Whitman, ‘Separating Church and State: The Atlantic Divide’ (2008) 34
Historical Reflections 86. On the use of religion in sentencing in the United States, see
also Mark Greenlee, ‘Faith on the Bench: The Role of Religious Belief in the Criminal
Sentencing Decisions of Judges’ (2000) 26 University of Dayton Law Review 2; Sanja
18
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there would be much to worry about if this simplistic insertion of religion
into the world of judicial punishment were the direction or thrust of my
argument. But I am not offering an argument for judicial reasoning from
biblical mandate, nor for the suppression of the distinctive judicial task—
that of reasoning through and with publicly generated legal norms—in
favour of religious moralising. I am neither sanguine in the face of the
risks of injecting religion into the judicial task, nor am I complacent about
the importance of the judicial discipline of public reasoning. In that
sense, although I am questioning the political desirability of building too
tall a wall between the character of judicial authority and the religious
identity of judges, I am not squarely joining the debate about the
character and content of judicial reasons in some form of rejoinder to
Rawls.19 Rather, the inquiry here is into how else the appearance of
religion as an aspect of a judge’s identity and belonging, which so
troubled Bouchard and Taylor and vexes many others, might be
differently coded. How else might we read it?
Why, then, select the fraught area of punishment and sentencing—
the archetypal case of state coercion—as the basis for exploring these
ideas about judicial authority and religious identity? Of course the
answer is, in part, linked to the story told in the introduction: it was the
prospect of punishment and coercion of the accused that led Bouchard
and Taylor to distinguish the case of judges (as well as police and
correctional officers) from other public officials, who they felt should be
permitted to display religious affiliations. Punishment played, in this
way, the key role in creating an otherwise unlikely convergence between
these two significant recent policy statements on religious
accommodation in Quebec.

Zgonjanin, ‘Quoting the Bible: The Use of Religious References in Judicial Decisions’
(2005) 9 New York City Law Review 31.
For this kind of discussion of appeals to religion in light of the character of public
reasoning see, eg, Mark C Modak-Truran, ‘Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law and
the Relationship Between Law and Religion’ (1997) 26 Capital University Law Review 461;
Michael J Perry, Religion in Politics: Constitutional and Moral Perspectives (New York,
Oxford University Press, 1997); Scott C Idleman, ‘The Limits of Religious Values in
Judicial Decisionmaking’ (1998) 81 Marquand Law Review 537. The frame for this debate
is, of course, very much set by John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997)
64 University of Chicago Law Review 765; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Religion in the Public
Sphere’ (2006) 14 European Journal of Philosophy 1.
19
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Yet punishment offers a uniquely valuable sightline into the
judicial role in Canada for reasons that have to do with the process and
nature of sentencing. For most of Canadian criminal law history,
criminal punishment was essentially unguided by legislation, with no
statements in the Criminal Code of the purposes and principles of
sentencing.20 Choice of punishment was a quintessential example of
judicial discretion, with judges left to generate their own theories and
objectives of sentencing. This fundamentally discretionary approach was
subject to forceful critique, with concerns voiced about consistence,
predictability, and transparency. In the mid-1990s, Parliament sought to
respond with a wholesale revision to the sentencing provisions of the
Criminal Code. And yet the 1995 amendments did little to alter the
essentially discretionary character of sentencing in Canada. Parliament
offered a veritable buffet of sentencing objectives, ranging from
deterrence and denunciation to rehabilitation and the cultivation of
responsibility, with no indication as to which objective a judge ought to
select and when, nor of the relative weighting or priority of these
objectives.21 The sentencing principles remain broad and woolly, leaving
intact the substantial margin for manoeuvre available to the sentencing
judge. Indeed, the legislation’s newly formulated ‘fundamental purpose
of sentencing’ underscored the deeply normative and evaluative
character of the sentencing enterprise. Section 718 explained that this
fundamental purpose ‘is to contribute, along with crime prevention
initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful
and safe society by imposing just sanctions’,22 sanctions that pursue one
or more of the listed objectives. Although precedent and some legislative
minima and restrictions shape the judge’s range of options, the moment
of punishment invites the judge to make broad judgments not just about
the facts of a case and the character of an act, but about a ‘just society’
and the character of an offender’s circumstances and life’s story.
For an excellent brief history of sentencing in Canada, see Allan Manson, The Law of
Sentencing (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2001) 14–29.
20

Parliament has since offered some limited guidance in this respect, indicating in ss
718.01, 718.02, and 718.03 that primary consideration should be given to the objectives
of deterrence and denunciation in cases of offences against children, and certain
offences committed against peace officers, law enforcement, and other participants in
the justice system. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 718.01, 718.02, 718.03.
21

22

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 718.
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The result is that in the act of sentencing we find one of the most
forceful and violent expressions of the authority of the state matched
with a high degree of discretion afforded to the decision-maker. How to
realise the fundamental objectives of sentencing; how to respond well,
and in an individualised way, to the person that has found their way
before the court; how to balance the competing interests involved in the
moment of sentencing: the nature of the system is that these are matters
of ineradicable and deep indeterminacy to which we accept that judges
bring certain kinds of personal instincts, perspectives, and experiences.
Without much by way of rule-based buffer, the whole person of the judge
is drawn into an encounter with the person, responsibility, and deeds of
the offender. Comforting ideas that the judge is simply a speaker of state
law wither in the sentencing environment. Another way of putting this
is that there is, in sentencing and punishment decisions, no plausible
retreat to the conceits of legal formalism. Sentencing is one place where
it is very difficult not to accept that who the judge is—the content of her
conscience and philosophy of crime and punishment—matters deeply.
In the moment of punishment, the clearest and most potent moment of
the exercise of the raw will and coercive force of the state meets the
principled but wide-ranging discretion of the sentencing judge. It is this
very confluence that points, I will suggest, to why markers of religious
and normative pluralism in a judiciary should be welcomed, not
prohibited, or even merely tolerated.
A HISTORICAL EXCURSION
The demand for proof beyond reasonable doubt is one of the
pillars of contemporary criminal law. It stands as an emblem of the
modern, enlightened administration of criminal justice and, within that
realm, serves as a virtual synecdoche for the rule of law. Its relationship
to the rule of law flows from the imagined position that it occupies in the
criminal process. It is thought that this standard of proof stands between
the fearful and potentially tyrannical power of the state and the liberty of
the subject, serving as a protective principle that ensures that the morally
innocent are not improperly swept up in the machinery of state
punishment. As we understand it today, then, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is a much-cherished but rather simple principle—a
feature of modern law that serves to protect the accused from wrongful
conviction.

10
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As it turns out, the history is far more complex and interesting.
This complicated history points to a very different function for the idea of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it is a history that ties together religion,
state authority, and punishment in provocative ways. In this section, I
turn to this history as a means of excavating resources for thinking
differently about the place that religious adherence might occupy in our
picture of criminal judgment.
At the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, Pope Innocent III
prohibited the clergy from participating in trial by ordeal. This edict
effectively abolished the principal means of criminal trial in England, but
it also released a flood of anxiety into the criminal justice system. To be
sure, trial by ordeal had been a terrible event for the accused. Whether
by hot iron, cold water, or (for the higher-status accused) battle, trial by
ordeal must have been a fearful process, all the more so in light of the
mortal consequences of a finding of guilt. And yet it posed little concern
or anxiety for those involved in administering criminal law. The logic of
ordeal was straightforward enough: in the epistemology of the time, the
ordeal offered a direct point of access to God’s judgment as to the guilt of
the accused. Concerned with the taint of blood for the clergy who
oversaw these ordeals, when Pope Innocent III banned clergy
participation, matters shifted entirely. Now that direct judgment from
God could not be secured, criminal judgment would have to be a human
matter. As James Whitman shows in The Origins of Reasonable Doubt,23
this shift in responsibility after the ordeal generated deep moral anxiety,
an anxiety that would be crucial to the development of the contemporary
criminal trial.
Whitman explains that the act of human judgment—suddenly
necessary in a post-ordeal world—was understood to be a deeply
perilous and risky business. ‘Early modern Christians’, Whitman writes,
‘experienced great anxiety about the dangers that acts of judgment
presented for the soul’ because ‘any sinful misstep committed by a judge
in the course of judging “built him a mansion in Hell”’.24 Phrases such as
‘judge not lest ye be judged’, and ‘they that take up the sword shall
perish by the sword’ rang in the ears of those responsible for judgment
with a resonance and force that it is difficult to imagine today. In the
23 James Q Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal
Trial (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008).
24

ibid 3.
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case of criminal judgments, with the mortal and bloody consequences so
often associated with conviction, the peril was particularly acute because,
in the theological atmosphere of the time, the individual who judged
wrongly was responsible for and polluted by this bloodshed, wielding
the sword just as the soldier did. The stakes were high, then, not only for
the accused but also for the judge, whose soul was at stake in each act of
criminal judgment.
When the ordeals ended in 1215, the need to judge collided with a
complex theology of doubt that had generated out of this anxiety around
human judgment. A doctrine called the ‘safer path’ had developed in
moral theology, and instructed that ‘in cases of doubt, “in dubiis,” one
should act in such a way as to minimize the possibility of pollution’.25
Trepidation about pronouncing judgment in the presence of doubt was
deep. Without the moral comfort of the ordeals, other means would have
to be found to manage this anxiety about judgment, and many of those
techniques were the progenitors to the characteristic features of our
modern criminal trial. The jury itself, Whitman explains, was one such
device for the moral comfort of judges, shifting moral peril from judges
to lay jurors who were placed under ‘exceptional moral pressure’.26
Jurors, no less aware of the ‘safer path’ than judges, were reticent to
convict in the presence of any uncertainty. Over the course of the
thirteenth to seventeenth centuries, however, techniques of
responsibility-shifting (including the special verdict and benefit of clergy)
and jury control (including, in the seventeenth century, fining and even
imprisoning jurors) allowed the system to extract convictions from juries.
However, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries these
practices fell into disrepute. Benefit of clergy withered and jury control
was abolished. And with this, jurors fell back on the safer path, reluctant
to convict.
Moral theology responded to the risk that this posed to the
administration of justice, and its response was the doctrine of reasonable
doubt. Yes, it was a grave matter—a matter that implicated one’s soul—
to judge another when one had doubt. But this did not mean, this
doctrine held, that you had to be concerned with any doubt whatsoever.
No, your soul was safe, theologians explained, as long as you harboured
25

ibid 117.

26

ibid 127.

12

Published in Benjamin L Berger and Richard Moon, eds., Religion and the Exercise of
Public Authority (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2016) 23.

no reasonable doubt. The origins of reasonable doubt were, thus, as a
means to encourage conviction, not to discourage it. It was a device of
moral comfort, not one aimed at factual proof. Whitman summarises the
provocative conclusion as follows:
the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard was not originally
designed to make it more difficult for jurors to convict. It was
designed to make conviction easier, by assuring jurors that their
souls were safe if they voted to condemn the accused. In its
original form, it had nothing to do with maintaining the rule of law
in the sense that we use the phrase, and nothing like the
relationship to the values of liberty we ascribe to it today. It was
the product of a world troubled by moral anxieties that no longer
trouble us much at all.27
The principal contemporary lesson that Whitman draws from this
history of reasonable doubt is that, with the loss of this pervasive
Christian moral frame, modern law has become comfortable—perhaps
too comfortable—with judging. Indeed, he argues that ‘[o]ne of the
features that makes our law modern is our lack of anxiety about judging
others.’28 The historical fear around judgment was an artefact of the
saturation of the public and private lives of the judge and juror alike with
the worldview and absolute authority of Christian moral theology.
‘Modern secularization has brought the decline of the fearful religiosity
of the past.’29 Most people—including judges and jurors—no longer
move in their lives trembling with fear for the eternal fate of their souls.
In many respects, release from this kind of day-to-day fear is a good
thing: ‘humans who no longer quake and tremble are humans who live
richer lives in many ways.’30 And yet that fear and anxiety in criminal
adjudication served a function: it helped to restrain the violent hand of
the criminal law. Be it in the development of demanding burdens and
standards of proof or in the creation of procedural rules such as jury
unanimity, this sense of moral discomfort in the exercise of criminal
judgment tended historically to translate into a kind of parsimony in the
27

ibid 5.

28

ibid 6.

29

ibid 7.

30

ibid.
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use of the criminal law. Whitman concludes, harrowingly, that ‘[t]he
larger truth is that we have slowly been losing the capacity to gaze into
our own breasts and ask ourselves hard questions about when and how
we have the right to punish others’.31
It would be a mistake to fall into nostalgia for this period in the
criminal trial or to become Pollyannaish about the historical influence of
Christianity on the uses to which criminal law and trial processes have
been put. Yet there is significant value in the specific lesson that, in the
presence of uncertainty, a due measure of anxiety about judgment is a
salutatory thing. And this lesson, along with the details of the historical
excursion that teaches it, points to something of structural interest for the
purposes of this chapter. The story of the origins of reasonable doubt
offers an example of how the meeting of religious conscience and the
barest form of coercive power generated attitudes of restraint and
scepticism about the uses of state power. When the seventeenth-century
juror gazed into his breast, he found a source of authority in Christian
moral theology that offered an important counterpoint to the raw
coercive authority of the state. The salutary anxiety that Whitman
identifies was produced because state punishment had to pass through
the person of a judge/juror whose normative reference points could not
be readily assimilated to law enforcement interests or kingly authority
alone. This moral independence of the juror from the government was
disciplined and controlled for centuries through mechanisms of jury
control and responsibility-shifting; the story of reasonable doubt is the
story of finding a way to assuage that anxiety in service of more efficient
and reliable punishment. Yet it remains true that Christian theology was
a force to contend with in the development of modern criminal law,
forceful because it offered an alternative footing on which to stand in
judgment of the rightness of an act of punishment.
One might feel as though this digression into legal history has
taken us far afield from this chapter’s questions about judges, religious
symbols, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, and the ‘Charter of Quebec
Values’. It is, however, just this structural observation—an observation
about the importance of moral independence in the act of judgment—
that offers the key to an alternative reading of religious symbols and the
judicial role, a reading that might in fact have particular salience and
appeal at the moment of state coercion or punishment.
31
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READING RELIGION AND THE JUDGE
Equipped with this account from the history of the common law
criminal trial, I return to the matter at hand: how to read the appearance
of religious symbols on the person of a judge. The Bouchard-Taylor
report reflected the instinct that there was something about the capacity
to exercise state coercion—what the commissioners called ‘the power of
punishment’32—that made the case for ‘circumspection’ particularly
strong. Consider the heart of Bouchard and Taylor’s argument leading to
their suggested prohibition on judges wearing items that would mark
religious belonging:
Everyone will agree that this type of situation must be broached
with the utmost caution. The case of judges is probably the most
complex and the hardest to decide upon. It is essential that the
parties involved in a trial, especially the respondent, who may be
punished, can assume the judge’s impartiality. Could a Muslim
respondent assume the impartiality of a Jewish judge wearing a
kippah or a Hindu judge displaying a tilak?33
The next line of the report makes the assertion that ‘[t]he right to a fair
trial is one of the acknowledged basic legal rights of all citizens.’34
Notice how this reading of the religious symbol proceeds: the
symbol of religious belonging is implicated in issues of impartiality and
fair trial rights. The symbol worn by one of these imagined judges is
evidence of religious particularity, and this particularity translates into
the possible apprehension of partiality. The protection of the fair trial
rights of the accused thus requires that we ensure that there is no
evidence that the judge is compromised by religious particularity. And
yet with the historical excursion in hand, I think that we might imagine a
very different reading of the marker of the judge’s religious belonging,
one that flips the argumentative valence of the moment of punishment or
coercion.
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Rather than tethering the religious symbol to concerns about
impartiality (understood here as dependent on non-particularlity), one
might choose to focus instead on the basal judicial norm of
independence. Judicial independence is amongst the most fervently
invoked and jealously guarded principles in the structure of our justice
system. It is a commitment protected both by explicit right and by
implication in the Canadian constitution.35 Notably, most discussion of
and jurisprudence about judicial independence focuses on the
institutional paraphernalia of independence: security of tenure,
protections around remuneration, and such. And yet the underdiscussed heart of the principle is independence of mind: a kind of
conscientious or moral independence. This is what the accused desires at
the moment of judgment or punishment. The accused’s chief interest is
not in an abstract philosophical impartiality, but rather impartiality as
between the accused and his antagonist, the prosecuting authorities. The
central hope is for a judge that is independent from the interests or raw
will of the government. This is the foundation of the fair trial right. And
if this idea of moral independence is brought into focus, the particularity
of the religious symbol might designate something quite different and
salutary: a marker for the existence of evaluative footings that are not
reducible to the prevailing governance interests of the executive.
Both the structural logic and the practical realities of rights
protection in the criminal justice system turn on the existence of a buffer,
in the person of the judge, between law enforcement authorities and the
subject. It is precisely at the moment of coercion—where there exists the
power of punishment—that a distance between government and judge is
most imperative. It is at this moment that the hope is most ardent that
the authority and interests of government will not be the sole perspective
from which power is exercised. And it is therefore at this moment that
we might actually have the greatest appetite for the showing of religious
particularity within our judiciary. The appearance of religious symbols
amongst members of the judiciary can be read (and should be
encouraged to be read) as a reminder that judges cannot be neatly
assimilated into the apparatus of the government, functioning solely as
agents of its will and authority. These symbols could be viewed as
reminders of how important it is that judges have the moral
See Adam Dodek and Lorne Sossin (eds), Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto,
Irwin Law, 2010).
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independence that comes with evaluative footings that cannot be tidily
identified with the perspectives of the legislature or executive.
Consider the historical case of the origins of reasonable doubt. In
that story the religious conscience of adjudicators did not serve to
aggravate punishment; the rule of law did not admit of that kind of
effect. Rather, religion introduced a ground for scepticism and caution in
the exercise of state authority through the imposition of state violence.
Christianity offered resources that created a counterpoint to ideals of
efficient and confident punishment.
Ultimately, those cautionary
principles had to find expression in the law, giving rise, as Whitman
explains, to a number of the central features of our contemporary
criminal trial. But the religious particularity of the judges and jurors
served as an avenue through which these decision-makers achieved
critical distance from the pure will of state authority, testing the will to
punish against norms of justice and fairness that were not endogenous to
the prevailing logic of government. That history is a rather potent
expression of the idea of judicial independence and its value to a justice
system.
Of course, there is nothing to assure us that the religious
conviction that opens up this distance will always counsel a posture of
mercy or mitigation. The moral independence that is signalled by
symbols of religious belonging could instil an appetite to punish, or as a
matter of outcome in a given case, align the judge with the interests and
power of the government, rather than inducing scepticism about the use
of criminal law. Although the historical example of the development of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a story about religion as a force for
parsimony and restraint, it would be a mistake to imagine that religious
belief will consistently induce that salutary attitude. Yet in this respect
we are in no different a position than we would find ourselves with a
religiously committed judge whose religion does not involve symbolic
displays, or with a judge inspired by otherwise-sourced political or
philosophical commitments. Moreover, at a historical moment in which
prevailing interpretations of the mixing of religious identity and public
authority are so often negatively charged, we do well to meditate on
examples of the goods—including a scepticism about state power in the
context of criminal punishment—that religious commitment can bring.
But what is ultimately appealing about the appearance of religious
symbols within the judiciary is not a particular normative valence, but
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what is structurally communicated: the independence of the judge who is
tasked with sitting in review of exercises of state power.
Read within these terms, consider the picture of the judiciary that
is invited by the prohibition on religious symbols suggested in the
Bouchard-Taylor Commission and the proposed ‘Charter of Secularism’.
That ban on religious symbols is not, of course a ban on symbols
associated with the judiciary and the act of punishment. Symbols
abound in that setting, but they are all the symbols of state authority.
The coat of arms, the flag, the uniforms of public office, the ‘Crown’, ‘Her
Majesty’, the trappings of government buildings—everything that an
accused meets through the process of state coercion is an expression of
state authority and power. Stripped of markers of her own particularity,
there is little to obviously distinguish the person of the judge from the
machinery of punishment. The authority of the government and the
ends of justice are too neatly aligned when all symbols and language
within a justice system are those endogenous to law itself. We have
never allowed the authority of law and the ends of justice to be collapsed
in this way. Throughout our legal history, equity has been a structural
space for the exercise of conscience that is not reducible to law alone.
And through the royal prerogative of mercy, prosecutorial discretion,
and the power of jury nullification, the criminal justice system has
continued to depend on, cultivate, and protect ways in which justice
requires that law be supplemented with assessments and evaluation from
other grounds of moral and ethical judgment.36 Manifestations of
cultural and personal particularity (of which religious symbols are one
example) could serve as a welcome reminder that, amongst those
through whom the coercive force of the state must pass, there exist
footings for just this kind of sceptical posture.37 Viewed in this way,
contemporary religious pluralism affords us a symbolic cache for
See Benjamin L Berger, ‘The Abiding Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against
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markers of this kind of moral independence, so central to the task of
judging.
One might object that this argument suggests that we can expect
greater independence or impartiality from judges who wear items that
mark their religious belonging. To be clear, my argument is not that the
sceptical position that I have described is somehow only possible
perceivable where religion is brought into the courtroom. My interest is
not with whether a particular judge does or does not wear a religious
symbol. Instead, what should be attractive to us is the appearance of
various moral touchstones and resources in the aggregate picture of the
judiciary, because this helps to mark the judiciary as a collegium of
ethical reasoners who enjoy moral independence from the claims of
government authority alone. Each judge benefits from the presence of
others who manifest this particularity. The existence of a turbaned judge
down the hall who is deciding a bail matter benefits the many others who
wear no such symbols of religious belonging. It benefits them by
association, if you will. Having, in the aggregate, a judiciary that
represents a range of moral and ethical resources that may play a role
within the legal discipline of hearing, arguing, reason-giving, appealing,
and dissenting, reminds and comforts the public that this is not a branch
that is just about the technocratic execution of legislative or executive
will. With the presence of these symbols in our composite picture of the
judiciary, we are reminded of the many forms and sources—some visibly
marked, some not—of the sceptical, independent ground that we hope
our judges will occupy. Judges are still, of course, bound to the defining
practice of reason-giving through and within the law. We insist,
throughout, that whatever scepticism one has can fit within and be
articulated through public legal norms. And yet, though part of the state
apparatus, they are not reducible to servants of government authority or
command.
It seems to me that, contrary to the argument advanced by
Bouchard and Taylor, this matters most in light of the power of
punishment and aware of the risks of state coercion. Should the
prevailing attitudes of the government and its exercises of state authority
become unjust or excessive, a judiciary equipped with moral resources
drawn from other perspectives seems a salutary thing, indeed. Might we
adopt this reading of the appearance of religious symbols in the judicial
setting, a reading in which the presence of such symbols comforts us by
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evidencing a public role as decision-makers whose resources for critiques
of state power are rich and various?
CONCLUSION: COLIN WESTMAN AND MICHEL FOUCAULT
Over many years, Prime Minister Harper’s Conservative
government has marched a path of ‘tough on crime’ reform to Canadian
criminal law. Central to that project was the revision of key elements of
the sentencing regime, all of which restricted the freedom with which
judges can craft sentences in pursuit of Parliament’s putative will that the
primary principle of sentencing be that of proportionality.38 The Harper
government has introduced a spate of new mandatory minimum
sentences, extinguished the use of conditional sentences for most
offences, limited the credit available for pre-trial detention, and imposed
higher victim fine surcharges. Although judges have responded to
defence arguments on each of these points, and some of these matters
have come before the Supreme Court of Canada,39 it is the latter
example—that of the new mandatory victim surcharges—that produced
the most widespread and open conflict between the judiciary and the
government. Judges across the country took up legal arms against this
fee, some giving offenders decades to pay the fee, others ruling the
surcharge unconstitutional, and some simply refusing to order the fine.40
Out of this controversy, Justice Colin Westman emerged as
something of the public face of judicial resistance to the tough on crime
agenda. He earned notoriety for taking a very public and strident stance
against the surcharge, voicing his concerns through the media—an
unconventional and controversial move for a sitting judge. Justice
Westman, who took measures in court to evade the surcharge,
denounced the government’s measures, calling the surcharge a ‘tax on
38

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 718.1.

For a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada declaring certain mandatory
minimum sentences unconstitutional, see R v Nur 2015 SCC 15.
39

See Sean Fine, ‘Judges Defy Order to Impose Tories’ Victim-Services Surcharge’ The
Globe and Mail (Toronto, 9 December 2013)
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/judges-defy-order-to-impose-tories-victimservices-surcharge/article15820100/. For example, in R v Michael 2014 ONCJ 360,
Justice David Paciocco ruled that s 737 of the Criminal Code, which provides for the
victim surcharge, was unconstitutional.
40

20

Published in Benjamin L Berger and Richard Moon, eds., Religion and the Exercise of
Public Authority (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2016) 23.

“broken souls”’.41 Drawing attention to the poverty, mental illness, and
dislocation that so many of those who come before him suffer, and
voicing his dismay at the prospect of fining these people, Justice
Westman explained his actions – both in the courtroom and in the media
– as follows:
Those people in the soup kitchens I see in the courtroom, they
don’t have a voice. I think I have an obligation to them. These are
my brothers and sisters, from a theological perspective.42
Quoting these words, Sean Fine, the justice reporter for the Globe and Mail
notes: ‘Justice Westman wears a Christian cross under his judicial
vestments.’43
The theological language used by Justice Westman, and the cross
sitting under his gowns, no doubt irritate some, or even appear
unseemly. Justice Westman certainly received substantial criticism for
his engagement with the media and for his judicial approach to the
surcharge. Of Westman’s conduct, Professor Adam Dodek is quoted as
commenting, ‘Judges cannot pick and choose which laws they like and
which they do not. This undermines the rule of law and public
confidence in the administration of justice’.44 Yet without necessarily
defending Justice Westman’s conduct, one can cull a more interesting
and subtle lesson from this set of events, one that arguably shows a
thinness in this sense of the rule of law and what might feed public
confidence in the judiciary. In this case, Justice Westman’s religious
convictions, hidden though they were to those appearing before him,
served as a lever for wedging space between the technocratic execution
of the will of the government and the act of just punishment.
In his lectures on ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’, Foucault noted that
one feature of the rise of neoliberalism was the ‘anthropological erasure
of the criminal’.45 Over the course of the nineteenth century, there had
41
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been a tendency to understand crime in a way that involved the
‘psychological, sociological, and anthropological problematization of the
person on whom the law is applied’.46 Foucault explains that with
neoliberalism, this anthropological and individualised criminal—this
homo criminalis—was replaced by homo economicus. As the market became
the authoritative index of all legitimate government action, and human
action was thus best interpreted through that grid of intelligibility, crime
became just another form of economic action, with the criminal ‘treated
only as anyone whomsoever who invests in an action, expects a profit
from it, and who accepts the risk of a loss’.47
The victim surcharge was a pristine expression of a neoliberal
frame for understanding crime and the criminal. Many Canadian judges
have resisted this prevailing logic of criminal justice reform and have
done so without manifest recourse to religious commitments; and
whatever their posture, all judges have worked within and through the
law.
And yet for Justice Westman, theology was a means of
reintroducing an anthropology of the criminal. For this judge, religion
was a resource to draw on to recomplicate the picture of crime and
criminals painted by the government. Judges, through judgments about
punishment and sentencing, have always done that: they have met
dominant narratives about justice, crime, and society, with inconvenient
facts and complicating stories. In a society characterised by deep
religious pluralism, might it be that we should welcome evidence of the
religious particularity of judges as enrichments of that quintessential role
of the judge? Perhaps we should re-read religious symbols as markers of
the moral independence of the judiciary.
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